Denver Law Review
Volume 26

Issue 10

Article 1

1949

Vol. 26, no. 10: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
26 Dicta (1949).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

f
VOLUME 26
1949

f
The Denver Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association
1949

Printed in U.S.A.

THE BRADFORD-ROBINSON PRINTING CO.
Denver, Colorado

VOL. XXVI

OCTOBER, 1949

No. 10

A New Partner in An Old Enterprise
A Joint Statement by
President STANLEY H. JOHNSON of the Denver Bar Association
President WILLIAM H. RoBINSON, JR., of the Colorado Bar Association

With this issue of DICTA, the College of Law of the University of Denver

joins with the Denver and Colorado bar associations in an experiment in
cooperation-an experiment in cooperatively publishing this journal. Similar
joint publication arrangements exist between bar association and law schools
in the states of Maryland, Nebraska, North Carolina, Washington and
Wyoming.
The invitation to Denver University to participate in DICTA formally was
extended by the Board of Trustees of the Denver Bar Association at its
meeting on August 17. At the same time, the president of the Colorado Bar
Association gave his tentative approval of the project, subject to confirmation
by the Board of Governors and the annual meeting at Colorado Springs.
The decision to proceed in this three-way partnership in the publication
of DICTA is the fruition of long months of planning and negotiation. In the
spring of 1948, a Denver bar program committee recommended that a bigger
and better publication be provided for the membership. The Denver officers
invited the Colorado Bar Association and the Denver and Colorado law
schools accredited by the American Bar Association to join in a consideration
of this proposal.
At that time it was deemed possible that the four parties might be able
to unite in the publication of an enlarged Rocky Mountain Law Review,
present quarterly of the University of Colorado law school. Under such a
plan, DICTA would have disappeared as a separate publication, except possibly to serve as an administrative bulletin.
Meetings were held during the summer of 1948, and, upon general
acceptance of the joint RMLR publication plan by bar association officers
and law school faculties, it appeared that a partnership might be formed and
DICTA merged into a larger and more comprehensive law magazine available

to all the lawyers of the state.
This objective, however, was not realized. Ultimate approval of the
project on the part of Colorado University resided in the Board of Regents.
No action was forthcoming from the board until April 20, 1949, when it
decided to reject the joint publication plan for RMLR.
When that decision was released, negotiations looking toward a threeway cooperative publication proceeded rapidly.
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Dean Gordon Johnston and Allen Mitchem, professor in charge of legal
writing at the University of Denver College of Law, met with officers of the
Denver association and a special committee designated by the president,
composed of Peter H. Holme, Jr., and Frederick M. Farrar.
These negotiations culminated in the formal invitation to Denver University by the Board of Trustees to participate in the publication of a 48 page
monthly journal on an experimental basis until January 1951, to which
agreement, the Colorado Bar Association president gave the tentative approval of his organization.
The present publication is the result, although there has been no opportunity for the long-term planning of articles, features and make-up that is
contemplated for the future. It is a 16 page increase over previous numbers
and is published by a joint editorial board made up of DU students and bar
association representatives.
Denver University officials would have preferred a 96 page bi-monthly
journal, which would be more akin to other law school reviews and give more
time for preparation of each number. Opposition to a change from the
monthly basis was expressed by the board, however, on the grounds that
much of DICTA'S usefulness to the practicing lawyer would be lost. The
Denver University representatives then agreed to the present 48 page magazine for the experimental period.
The basic premise in all these negotiations of your bar association officers
was that DICTA would become a more useful reference magazine for Colorado
lawyers without increase in cost to them. For the University of Denver
College of Law, it will provide an outlet for students and faculty that has
long been needed.
As a successor to the old Denver Record, DICTA was founded in 1928
under the guiding hand of Henry W. Toll, then president of the Denver Bar
Association, and S. Arthur Henry, the first editor. Until 1939 it was published exclusively by the Denver association, but beginning with the January
issue of that year, the Colorado Bar Association joined as an equal partner
in its publication. Now, if the present experiment is approved by the Board
of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association and meets with success in
operation, DICTA may continue to expand its usefulness to the legal profession.

HAVE YOU MADE YOUR PLANS
to be in

COLORADO SPRINGS
OCTOBER 13, 14 and 15i
Don't Miss the 51st Annual Meeting
of Your Bar Association

DICTA

Notes On Legal Education and the Profession

of Law
By

GORDON JOHNSTON,

Dean, University of Denver College of Law

I. A Note of Appreciation
The University of Denver College of Law is happy to accept the invitation of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations to join with them in
publishing DICTA. In accepting the invitation, we conceive of much good
that may come to us, and an uncomfortable sense of heavy obligation might
assail us were it not for cordial assurances from the gentlemen of the bar that
they conceive of much good that may come to the profession through this
joint venture.
We dedicate ourselves, in our share of the enterprise, to making as great
a contribution as possible through these pages to the profession. Realization
of that purpose can only be achieved if DICTA continues to be a thoroughly
useful, entirely readable journal. Our articles will be written with that end
in mind. Such a purpose is certainly not inconsistent with a scholarly product,
but scholarship for its own sententious accomplishment is not our objective,
as it has never been the ultimate aim of contributors to DICTA.
I speak for the student body and the faculty of our school in expressing
a grateful "Thank you" for the opportunity given our students to work
profitably in the field of legal writing.
II. Contributions of The Bar To Legal Education
Words of editorial welcome to us are expressed elsewhere in this issue by Stanley H. Johnson, on behalf of the Denver Bar Association, and
by William Hedges Robinson, Jr., President of the Colorado Bar Association.
The generous fraternal spirit they have expressed is greatly appreciated. Our
bar is notable for its aid to its younger members and to students in law schools
of the state. With unfailing good will and a genuine impulse to share in
the work of assisting earnest young men in their legal study, you have made
many contributions to the work of the schools.
Part-time teachers are invaluable members of our faculty at the University of Denver law school, and the honorarium with which their services
are rewarded is the least part of their compensation. Lecturers from the
bench and bar freely give from one to six class periods in our courses on
Trusts, Wills, Corporations, Regulation of Business, Equity, Taxation, Legal
Accounting, Ethics and Office Practice. You respond without murmur of
dissent when requested to speak to our students at our regular bi-weekly
luncheons. You come to us as judges of our moot court. You assist student
counsel opposed to you in cases in the Justice of the Peace and Municipal
Courts in which students are appointed to represent indigent clients. You
have recently been helpful to us in planning an improved curriculum. Many
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of you have taken students into your offices in part-time employment, and
have made them beneficiaries of your own learning-an incalculably valuable
supplement to their law school training.

M.

Are The Law Schools Drifting?

All of these things you have done and are doing for the cause of legal
education. You would be remiss, then, if you did not watch the schools with
a careful scrutiny to be assured that they too are serving their students and
our profession well.
You are watching! I refer you at once to President Robinson's finger,
pointing in the leading editorial in DICTA, August, 1949. "Where," he asks,
with undisguised alarm, "Where Are We Drifting?" Then he marshals facts
and figures to indicate the drift. The current is running too strong, he thinks,
towards the dam over which hapless law school graduates are carried into
stagnant back waters outside the profession, or, continuing in the main stream,
fighting to remain afloat, to clutch at unlawful reeds for vain support.
With forebearance and tact, the critic calls only upon the bar to seek a
solution to over-crowded law schools and an over-crowded bar; he expresses
no condemnation of the schools-there's no name-calling. The spirit of the
article is wholly constructive. It does, however, seem to call for a reply in
the same spirit.
The facts are not controverted. There were 747 students in Colorado's
law schools in the fall of 1948. No appreciable decline from that total registration is to be anticipated in the fall of 1949. Colorado in 1948 passed 85%
of all its applicants for admission to practice. The 1949 applicants exceed in
numbers those of 1948. How many are passed remains to be seen at the time
this is written. Are the schools and the bar examiners justified in these admissions? It would be presumptuous for me to attempt to answer for any
other than the school with which I am associated. Here, then, is a reply from
the University of Denver College of Law. The intent with which it is written
is certainly not to become controversial, but to give the bar an insight into
some of the problems as we see them.
Let this be the first proposition: we do not believe we are drifting. A
far larger student body than we had before the war has been admitted as a
matter of fixed policy. It is a policy held in common with many law schools.
It is well stated by Mr. Harrison S. Dimmitt, Secretary of Harvard Law
School, in the American Bar Association Journal of May, 1948: "When the
war came near its end, the Harvard Law School made one of the hardest
decisions of its 130 years. What was to be its obligation in legal education
when the great number of men then in uniform were discharged from the
service, thousands of whom would want to study law? Would these large
numbers be needed at the Bar? Was the School to continue acceleration for
these men, and what was to be the School's size? Was a 'mass production'
of lawyers at top speed wise-could the School maintain its standards**? The
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School gave what we believe to be the democratic answer: 'That the men who
fought the war were entitled to a good legal education and that Harvard
would make it available to the top limit of its physical facilities and teaching
staff, and would make every effort to do an excellent job in spite of the strain."
That democratic answer was given by nearly all law schools, the University of Denver among them. It met a responsive note in the G.I.'s need, and
the veterans came pouring in. We at D. U. reached a peak enrollment in
the fall of 1948: 372 students, of whom only 50 were not veterans, of whom
7 were women.
Our expansion to meet this challenge began in 1944. The full-time
faculty, numbering 4 in 1939, is today composed of 10. The dark and uninviting quarters of 1939 were abandoned and the law library, classrooms,
and faculty offices were moved to a rejuvenated building, adequate in its
facilities, at 14th Street and Court Place. A full-time librarian, full-time
assistant and student assistants were engaged. The budget soared to a figure
that would have seemed astronomical in 1939. The result is that 372 students
in 1949 are far better housed and taught than were those scant 69 students
who were with us a decade ago.
Our standards are higher today than ever heretofore. To be admitted,
an applicant must present a Bachelor's Degree or a -B-" average in his prelegal work. He will be accepted only after a personal interview (with the
exception of those from far distances.) He is urged to take the aptitude examination given by The Educational Testing Service of Princeton, New
Jersey, to give further assurance that he will not be found a misfit. And,
thus selected, he may only remain to finish his course if he can survive the
careful elimination of those not qualified for the study of law.
It is true here, as in most law schools, that the faculty, library, classrooms
and office facilities, and the quality of the instruction and of the instructed
are equal to the burdens large enrollments put upon them. We have not
"drifted" into our present large enrollment; it was expected and preparations
were made for its reception. Students are registered today in Denver University's College of Law from 37 states and territories; applications have been
received from every state in the Union.
IV. Are The Students Drifting?
The law schools long ago perceived, as have the lawyers, that not all who
enroll and survive to graduation and admission to the bar, can be absorbed
into the practice of the profession. With permission, this quotation is taken
from the current University of Colorado 'Law School catalogue: "Indications
are that the number of students graduating from law schools during the next
five or ten years will be greater than most communities can absorb. Successful lawyers, no doubt, will continue to make a great deal of money, and will
continue to be leaders in their communities, but there will be many lawyers
who find the competition too difficult and who will be compelled to turn to
other pursuits or be satisfied with indifferent success."
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To much the same effect is this statement from the current catalogue of
the University of Denver College of Law: "It is fair to say that the demands
imposed by the study of law are greater than those of most other schools. The
successful student must possess aptitude, superior scholastic ability, and a
willingness to study arduously and perseveringly through his years in the
College of Law. He must face the hard fact that now and in coming years the
competion in school and following his graduation will be keen; one of mediocre
abilities can at best attain only indifferent success in legal study and practice. * * * Legal study leads not alone to the practice of law. * * *"
Granting that many law students will never practice law, does it follow
that their years in legal study have been a tragic loss? Many lawyers seem
prone to believe so, though others share the law schools' belief that the answer
is emphatically "No!" Again quoting with permission, reference is made to
a report of the Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar of
the American Bar Association, 1945, by Charles B. Stevens, the secretary of
the Illinois State Bar Association, reprinted approvingly in Judge Arthur B.
Vanderbilt's thoughtful compilation, Studying Law :'
"Many who are admitted to the bar do not practice law, yet each finds
law training a valuable asset in his life work. * * * The administration of the
judicial functions of government is the form of public service most closely
related to the legal profession. * * * The growth of local, state and federal
agencies for the administration of government has created a wide variety of
opportunity for law-trained personnel in public service. The choice of occupations is broad enough to fit the personal talents and interest of almost any
individual. * * * Modern business and industrial corporations have found
it advantageous to establish full-time legal staffs within their own organizations. * * * Law training has proved a valuable asset in the careers of many
who have risen to executive positions in business or have otherwise engaged
in work that is not directly related to the practice of law. * * * Thus the
range of opportunities for application of law training is almost limitless,
either within or without the profession."
The schools subscribe to this statement. It seems to us to be indisputable
that every man who graduates from a law school should be a broader, better
educated person for that fact, better prepared to meet usefully and purposefully his responsibilities as a citizen, and better prepared to find fruitful
employment and to earn his livelihood, than he would have been had he not
entered the law school.
The students subscribe to this. It is noteworthy that at least one in six
tells us, in his personal interview prior to acceptance, that he has no intention to practice law if accepted and graduated. Many more, upon graduation,
are quickly placing themselves in positions in insurance, banking, accounting,
government, and in other businesses and professions, without even canvassing
the possibilities of the practice of law.
Washington Square Publishing Corporation, New York City, 1945.
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Most of today's law students are not drifting. They recognize that they
may not practice. They are preparing to meet life on a frankly competitive
basis, within or without the profession.
V. Are The Schools Realistic?
It seems clear that, if many of its graduates will certainly never practice
law, the law school should not be content to warn its students that practice
is precarious, but should also fit them, purposefully, for some other calling.
To this end, the University of Denver College of Law has fashioned its
so-called 2-2-2 program. Under this plan of study, a- qualified student may
enter the College of Law having completed only two years of pre-legal instruction, and having been guided, if a student of this university, by a law school
faculty adviser in his choice of pre-legal subjects. At the end of two years
in the College of Law, (four collegiate years in all) pursuing a straight law
course, the student who has an overall "C" average is awarded a Bachelor of
Science in Law degree. It represents similar attainment to that of the
Bachelor of Arts degree. It goes without saying that it does not permit its
holder to take bar examinations, or to hold himself out as one trained in law.
At this point in his college career, a student may wisely determine to
leave the law school. Or, the considerate faculty of the law school may determine for him that his qualifications do not warrant his continuing toward
the Bachelor of Laws degree, and may terminate his legal education.
If, however, the student desires to go on and is permitted to do so, in
his last two years (2-2-2) he finishes his professional law courses and also
follows a second major field of interest, usually in the realm of business
administration or public administration. In the choice of a second major
field of study, and in the making of his schedule, he receives individual
counsel from some full-time member of the law school faculty. At the end of
six years he receives his Bachelor of Laws degree and is eligible to take the
bar examinations; he has also done concentrated work in some other major
field of interest, and thus has two strings to his employment bow.
The 2-2-2 program exists side by side with the conventional 3-3 course.
Many schools have adopted or are contemplating adoption of a similar curriculum. It seems a realistic approach to the employment problems of law
students in this day of an overcrowded bar.
VI. Placement of Law School Graduates
It is in the field of placement of law school graduates that our best
opportunity for controlling the most critical problems of absorption of
fledgling lawyers is presented. The placement problem should be the joint
concern of the Colorado and local bar associations and of the law schools of
the state.
A canvass of the January and June graduates, 1949, of the University of
Denver College of Law disclosed that surprisingly few required assistance in
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placement. The school proposes, however, to create an effective placement
service for future graduates. We shall certainly not confine ourselves to seeking law office connections or to locating towns where a shingle may be hung
with some hope that it will not soon be ruefully taken down.
The Colorado Bar Association Committee on Economic Survey and
Placement has done a splendid job in counselling young lawyers who have consulted its members. It has been generous in meeting and guiding those who
have sought its aid, but little encouragement could be given them, for perplexingly few desirable openings in practice have come to its attention.
It is respectfully suggested that, through the office of the secretary or
otherwise, the Colorado and local bar associations could cooperate productively with the schools in setting up a placement service. Undoubtedly an
early step should be a careful canvass of every locality in the state for positions open in law and in related businesses. The bar could thus both serve
itself, its young attorneys, and the entire community. The present "flash
flood" of law school graduates would not then seem too threatening.

VII. Conclusion
In the February 1948 issue of the Bar Examiner, J. Virgil Cory, member
of the Ohio Bar Examining Committee, met possible critics of his state's bar
admission policy with this wise and warm-hearted statement: "I believe that
bar examiners should be scrupulously careful not to eliminate applicants
merely because of the temporary swollen number of applicants."
We believe, similarly, that well-qualified applicants for admission to law
schools should not, because of their temporarily swollen numbers, be denied
admission within the bounds set by a school's limitations of faculty, physical
facilities, and funds. We believe that with a sound program of legal instruction offered by the law schools, with careful selection of candidates for admission to the bar by our board of bar examiners, and with a placement
bureau jointly and effectively conducted by the schools and the bar associations, we can move to a new position assuring a better bar and wider usefulness to the profession and and the community.

Do Law School Enrollment Figures Justify Alarm?
By DAVID C. WHITLOW AND PHILIP G. GREGG
(Written while students at the University of Denver College of Law)

The present increased enrollments in law schools has been cited by some
writers as a cause for alarm. There are, however, some aspects of the problem
which have been apparently overlooked by these "alarmists" and which should
be called to the attention of the thoughtful observer.
Admittedly, there are more students in law schools today than ever
before in the history of this nation; but wc are entering a new era with new
problems and responsibilities, and there is no reason to believe that the
services of these new lawyers will not be needed in years to come.
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The number of persons entering the profession has been considered large
since the time when the memory of these writers runneth not to the contrary.
The principal difference between the present situation and the way it shaped
up before the war lies in the fact that the typical law graduate of today is
a much older man. Very likely, he has a family to support, and he can scarcely
afford to spend several years "getting established" during which time his
income will be substantially less than his necessary expenditures.
For those who are easily frightened by the large student population, it
would be helpful to compare some statistics showing the total law school
registration in the United States during the decade preceding the war years
with corresponding statistics for the years during and following the war.
Fall Registration
During Tear

Total Students
Enrolled '

Cumulative
Deficit

1930 ..............................................
40,847
39,417
1931 ..............................................
38,260
1932 ..............................................
38,771
1933 ..............................................

1934 .........................................
40,211
1935 .........................................
41,920
40,218
(There was an annual average
1936 .........................................
39,255
of 39,084 for the years 1930
1937 .........................................
37,406
through 1939 after which the
1938 .........................................
1939 .........................................
enrollment dropped off sharply.)
34,539
1940 ..............................................
30,036 ...................................
9,048
23,063
1941 ..............................................
2..............
2 ,069
10,019
1942 ..............................................
..................................
54,134
6,428 ...................................
1943 ..............................................
86,790
1944 ..............................................
7,493 ...................................
118,381
11,600 ...................................
1945 ..............................................
145,865
1946 ..............................................
39,775 ...................................
145,174
52,483 ...................................
1947 ..............................................
131,775
1948 ..............................................
56,9143 ...................................
If it be assumed that law school enrollment during the current decade
would have maintained a par with the enrollment for the preceding decade had
the war not intervened, the figures in the above table indicate that, as of 1948,
this country had a cumulative "deficit" of almost 114,000 law students. However, it should be mentioned that a great number of the law schools have been
operating year around since the war, and a student is able to graduate in
approximately 27 months in law school, whereas before the war it took 33
months to get the same degree. So the student-year deficit would actually be
I The Bar Examiner, August, 1948 at page 139.
, Supplied by the authors.
'The Bar Examiner, April, 1949 at page 86.
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somewhat less than the 114,000 shown above because of these accelerated
programs.
At any rate, it is apparent from the figures shown above that the present
infiltration from the law schools does not present an unexpected or previously
unknown threat to the legal profession. If the situation tends to cause alarm
at present, it is due to the fact that while the "war deficit" is being reduced,
absorption of new law graduates into the profession is not being sufficiently
accelerated. The real problem is one of placement, finding and filling the
positions left unoccupied during the war years and realizing the new opportunities extant in this post war period.

Junior Bar Tax Institute Begins October 25
The 1949 Junior Bar Institute, jointly sponsored by the Junior Bar
section of the Colorado Bar Association and the University of Denver College of Law, will get under way on Tuesday, October 25. This year's institute, the second consecutive one under similar auspices, will deal with miscellaneous Federal income tax problems, and will be conducted by William L.
Branch and Robert A. Lauterbach, Denver tax lawyers.
There will be six sessions beginning promptly at 8:15 p.m. on successive
Tuesday nights extending from October 25 to November 29. The meetings
will be held in the University of Denver law library at 1416 Court Place,
Denver, and all members of the Colorado Bar Association are invited to
attend. As in the case of the first Junior Bar Institute on real estate problems, no registration fee or other charge will be made.
H. Harold Calkins, institute chairman, has announced the following
schedule of lectures:
October 25-Introduction to material: the Code, regulations, and de,
partmental rulings; unwritten requirements; substance v. form; business
purpose; step transactions; constructive receipt and cash equivalent.
November 1-Tax considerations in selecting a form of business organization: various organization types; associations taxable as corporations; contrast of corporation and partnership in organization, operation and liquidation.
November 8-Buying and selling a business: tax investigation required;
purchase of assets v. acquisition of corporate stock; classification of assets;
allocation of price to group assets.
November 15-Taxation and deduction of alimony; penalty tax on
corporations.
November 22 and 29-Preparing 1949 individual tax returns; practical
problems involving typical transactions.
James Owen, former district judge and one of the patriarchs of the
Colorado bar, died on September 21, 1949. Mr. Owen was judge of the
Fourth Judicial District from 1907 to 1913. Prior to that time he had had
an active political career as district attorney and state senator. He had been
in a retired status since about 1940.
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Compulsory Health Insurance-No Way to

Better Medical Care
By J. PETER

NORDLUND

of the Denver Bar

In a special appeal to Congress on April 22nd of this year, the President requested the enactment of legislation to set up a system of so-called
compulsory insurance to meet the cost of medical, surgical, dental and hospital care for an estimated 85 percent of the people of this country. Bills
incorporating President Truman's request were introduced in both the Senate
and House on April 25th. The Senate bill (S. 1679) was sponsored by
Senators Thomas, Murray, Wagner, Pepper, Chavez, Taylor, McGrath and
Humphrey. The House bills (H.R. 4312 and 4313) were introduced by
Representatives Dingell and Biemiller, respectively. In this article, reference
will be made to the Senate bill, and only Title VII thereof, the most controversial part of the bill, will be discussed.
Whatever may be said for or against legislation of this pattern, I
believe there is rather general agreement that it is revolutionary in its theory
as applied to the United etates and is extremely far-reaching in its consequences. Such legislation deserves, and indeed demands, the most careful
thought of the members of the legal profession, not only because of its probable impact upon them as citizens and as members of a profession, but because of their real or potential role as leaders of public opinion, particularly
in matters calling for determination on the basis of fact and not fancy, of
reason and not emotion.
S. 1679 has many facets, but it presents at least three questions on
which we as members of the bar should be reasonably informed and have
crystallized opinions, viz; What are its provisions? What is the need for
such legislation? What will be its probable effects?
What Is The Bill?
Unfortunately, space does not permit a comprehensive digest of the
provisions of the bill, which has had predecessors in Congress with substantially
the same purpose and design. It is 163 pages long and consists of seven titles.
The first six relate respectively to education of health personnel, medical research, hospital surveys and construction, special aid to rural and other areas
which are short of medical personnel and facilities, and grants to states for
basic state and local health organizations and for health services not provided
for by Title VII. Title VII sets up the system of compulsory health insurance.
The administration of the system is to be delegated at the national level
to a National Health Insurance Board, to be created in the Federal Security
Agency. This board will have five full-time members, three of whom will
be appointed by the President by and with the advice of the Senate. The
other two will be the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health
Service and the Commissioner of Social Security. The President will designate
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one of the appointed members as chairman. Provision is made for a National
Advisory Medical Council which is to advise the board concerning matters
of general policy and administration arising in connection with the making
of regulations, the establishing of professional standards and the performance
of its other duties. The chairman of the board will be chairman of the council
and sixteen members are to be appointed by the Federal Security Administrator, certain representations on the council being prescribed.
At the state level, an approvable state plan must designate a single state
administrative agency. A state advisory committee must be created; membership on this committee shall consist of persons familiar with personal
health needs in urban and rural health areas (a majority of whom must be
representative of the interest of persons eligible for benefits), and of persons
representative of the professions, hospitals and other organizations that will
furnish the benefits. The state agency must make reports to the Federal board.
A state plan must also divide the state into local health areas and for
each such area there must be a local administrative committee or administrative officer, and in addition a local advisory committee to consist of not
less than eight nor more than sixteen members, a. majority of whom must
be representative of the interest of persons eligible for benefits. Local professional committees are to be appointed in accordance with the state plan.
If prior to July 1, 1950, a state has not an approved plan of operations,
the National Health Insurance Board will itself administer the program in
that state, beginning July 1, 1951, and will continue such administration until
one year after the submission and approval of a state plan of operations.
The Complicated Financial Provisions
To finance the compulsory health insurance program, the bill would
create on the books of the Treasury of the United States a separate account
to be known as the "Personal Health Services Account". While the statement has frequently been made that the funds to be placed in this account
will come, in the main, from a three percent payroll tax, split between employers and employees in covered occupations, on wages up to and including
$4,800 a year, there is no such specific provision in the bill. Nor is there any
definite statement concerning a tax to be imposed on the self-employed.
Title VII, on the contrary, provides that there will be appropriated to the
account for the fiscaf year ending June 30, 1952, and for each fiscal year
thereafter, sums equal to three percent of all wages estimated to be received
during such fiscal year. There will also be appropriated to the account (1)
sums equal to the estimated cost of furnishing dental and home nursing services during each such fiscal year and (2) any further sums required to
meet the expenditures to carry out Title VII, with a proviso that the aggregate appropriations made pursuant to (1) and (2) for any fiscal year from
1952 to 1954, inclusive, may not exceed one-half percent, and for any fiscal
year from 1955 to 1957, inclusive, one percent of the estimated annual
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average of all wages, as defined in the title, received during the three fiscal
years preceding such fiscal year.
There will be appropriated to the account, too, for the fiscal year 1951,
a sum equal to one per cent of all wages estimated to be received during such
fiscal year, to constitute a reserve fund for special allotments to the states for
use in case an emergency arises, such as for example an epidemic or a disaster.
From the general funds in the account, allotments will be made to the
states that have submitted approvable plans to the federal administrative
agency providing for the supplying of the contemplated health benefits.
Qualifying As A Beneficiary and Benefits
A potential beneficiary must qualify for services by meeting certain requirements spelled out in detail in the bill. He must, for example, have
received a specified amount as compensation during a given period preceding
the beginning of the benefit year. Non-insured persons, such as those who
are in the indigent class and who may be entitled to be furnished medical
care by either the state or by one of its political subdivisions, may become
entitled to the benefits promised by the bill if equitable reimbursements are
made on their behalf to the federal account by public agencies of the United
States, the several states or their political subdivisions.
The personal health services that are to be made available as benefits
are medical, dental, home nursing and hospital services and certain auxiliary
benefits, such as laboratory and therapy services, prescribed drugs, special
appliances and eyeglasses. Medical services, which may be rendered at
office, home or hospital, will consist of (1) general medical services such as
can be rendered by a general practitioner, including preventive, diagnostic and
therapeutic care and (2) specialist's services by a physician rated as a specialist by the federal board. Payments for hospital services will be based on the
least expensive multiple bed accommodations available in the hospital unless
the patient's condition necessitates use of private accommodation. Hospital
services will not include hospitalization in a mental or tuberculosis hospital.
Physicians, dentists, nurses, hospitals and others may qualify to render
services to beneficiaries if they wish to do so. Physicians and dentists and
other who decide not to participate in this program will be forced to limit
their practice to the estimated fifteen percent of the noncovered population or
possibly to covered individuals who are willing privately to contract and pay
for the services they need. Apparently the state agency may make agreements
with any organized group of individuals or consumer cooperative, any hospital or any hospital and its staff, or any organization operating a voluntary
health-service plan to provide the services to be made available by this title.
An eligible beneficiary is promised the right to select the physician,
dentist, nurse, medical group or hospital of his choice, provided the selectee
has agreed to participate in the program and consents to furnish services to
the beneficiary. This promise is subject to a further limitation. Maximum
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limits on the number of eligible individuals for whom any person may under,
take to render services may be fixed by the local administration committee or
officer on the basis of a recommendation of the professional committee in that
area that such limitation is necessary.
Other provisions of the bill will be referred to in the course of this
article. Necessarily, this outline of the bill is brief and incomplete.
What Is The Need For This Legislation?
Need is of course a relative term. What might be regarded as a necessity
at a given cost, no longer seems so indispensable if the price is greater. The
question as to the need for a federal health insurance program is therefore
closely related to the question of cost.
Good health, and the financial availability to everyone of medical and
hospital care to maintain or restore good health, are objectives with which
no one can quarrel. The question is, how may these objectives be best realized?
If they are not now being attained, can they or should they be realized through
a program of compulsory health insurance?
Advocates of this legislation would have us believe that the state of the
nation's health is so critical and that the standards of public health and
medical care are so low that the Government must interecede. No impartial
survey of the facts has yet been made which warrants such a conclusion.
In a recent statement before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Mr. Ray D. Murphy, vice president
and actuary of The Equitable Life Assurance Society, gave the following as
"some of the highlights of the record of achievement with respect to health
conditions in the United States in recent years:
"1. The overall death rate in the United States has been reduced by
more than 40 per cent since 1900. If allowance is made for the
higher proportion of older people in the population now than 50
years ago, then the death rate has been cut almost in half since the
turn of the century. To put these figures in another way, we are
now saving one and one-quarter million lives a year due to our
progress since 1900!
"2. The average life span has nearly doubled since the Republic was
founded and has increased by more than a third in the last half
century alone. Currently, the average expectancy of life is around
67 years as against little over 49 years at the turn of the century
and only 35 years at the beginning of the nation.
'3.Of the record crop of nearly 4,000,000 babies born in 1947, more
than half will be alive at the age of 72 based on present mortality
conditions. If mortality conditions prevailing at the beginning of
the century were continued in effect, only one-half would be alive
at the age of 58.
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The rate for infant mortality has been reduced more than one-half
and the rate for maternal mortality has been reduced four-fifths in
the last twenty years.
"5. The following diseases, once potent scourges, either have been
virtually wiped out or mortality from them has been reduced by
80% or more since 1900: scarlet fever, whooping cough, diphtheria,
measles, pneumonia, influenza, diarrhea, enteritis, tuberculosis, malaria, typhoid fever and smallpox."
He concludes: "This is not the stuff from which a health crisis can be made."
"4.

The Brookings Report on Medical Care
In 1947, the chairman of the above mentioned Senate committee invited the Brookings Institution to prepare a report on medical care for the
individual. Its report was released last year. The conclusions of the Brookings study are in substance the following with respect to the present state of
the nation's health:
1. Probably no great nation in the world has among its white population,
better health than prevails in the United States.
2. The United States under its voluntary system of medical care has
made greater progress in the application of medical and sanitary
science than any other country.
3. The non-whites in the United States have materially poorer health
than the whites, but the evidence does not indicate that this condition
is primarily or even mainly due to inadequacy of medical care.
4. The advances in health in the United States in the past four decades
do not suggest basic defects in the American system.
5. Although the so-called draft statistics have been widely used to
show bad health among the American people, they are unreliable as
a measure of the health of the nation.
Medical care for the pauper and the medically indigent classes present,
it is true, one of our greatest problems. But is the proposed legislation the
answer? In the past, provision has been made for them through philanthropy
or public assistance at the local or state level. In accordance with sound
American tradition there is where the responsibility should rest. If the local
or state agencies have made full effort to meet the needs, and, because of the
general economic condition of the state, fail, it may be necessary to resort
to federal assistance in the form of stand-by financial support of the state
program. Certainly, however, the medically indigent problem does not justify
a grant of power to the federal government to impose a single system of
medical care for all states and all people or of the right to control the administration of medical aid plans at the local level. Moreover, in the present
bill, provision for payment of benefits to this segment of the public is only
conditionally made.
In this connection, it should also be borne in mind, as pointed out by the

246

DICTA

Brookings study, that "the large majority of American families have the
resources to pay for adequate medical care if they elect to give it a high
priority among the several objects of expenditures. The issue is not whether
they can afford medical care, but whether they should be compelled by law
to pool their risks and to give payment for medical care a top priority."
Voluntary Prepaid Insurance A Better Answer
There is no doubt, of course, that there is a large group above the
medically indigent level who find the cost of a seious illness a grave financial
problem. Illness, however, is only one of the contingencies that might occur
to them with disastrous economic consequences. Their home might be destroyed by fire and the life savings which they had invested in it would be
gone. In driving their car, a momentary lapse might subject them to a legal
liability which would bankrupt them. Against these contingencies they have
voluntarily provided a hedge for themselves in the form of insurance. In
its essentials the contingency of loss through medical and hospital expense
presents no different problem, and these costs can be and should be provided
for on a prepaid insurance basis. In fact, apparently building on this philosophy, Title VII of the bill has been headed "Prepaid Personal insurance
Benefits", but the system set up by its elaborate provisions is definitely not
insurance. It utterly disregards insurance principles and should be more
aptly termed a "Health Taxation System".
There is nothing the Government can do in the field of health insurance,
however, that the individual cannot better do for himself and at far less
cost. This is not merely theory because the last two decades have seen amazing
progress in that direction. Though the Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations, commercial companies, labor unions and other plans, coverages for
hospital and medical costs are being provided. Through these voluntary plans,
it is estimated that a total of 61,000,000 Americans are now insured against
the cost of hospital care, about 34,000,000 against the cost of surgical care
and some 13,000,000 against the cost of general medical care not involving
hospitalization or surgery. It must be recognized, of course, that there is need
for expansion of these voluntary efforts, both in the scope of coverage and
in the number of people covered. That such expansion can be achieved in an
orderly evolution of these existing insurance devices, there can be no doubt;
and it can be done without compulsion or regimentation and without sacrifice of the attributes of personal responsibility, foresight and thrift which
have made this country what it is.
The philosophy of S. 1697 is not American. It is a product imported
from abroad, with the naive point of view that the proven failures of the
system wherever it has been tried can through the wisdom and astuteness of
our planners be avoided here. Before launching this nation on the experimental
course of government medicine, from which there can be no turning back,
as experience in other countries has shown, it is submitted that the proof of
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need should be clear and convincing. In any event, does not prudence dictate
a deferment until the gains and losses of the British experiment can be more
fully ascertained and evaluated.
Whct Will Be The Cost?
What the cost of the proposed legislation will be in terms of dollars
and cents, no one can say. Estimates vary from six billion dollars a year to
more than double that amount. To quote again from Mr. Murphy's statement:
"The cost is very uncertain. It depends on a large number of
factors, not the least of which is the amount of unnecessary medical
care which would be demanded as a matter of right.
"Experience abroad indicates the difficulty of accurate prediction
with respect to the cost of health services under government control
paid for by taxes. In Great Britain, for example, it is a matter of record
that the cost of the British program was underestimated by fully 40 per
cent for the first nine months of its operation which started in July last
year. The official figures for New Zealand show that the cost of its
health benefits have increased at a marked rate year after year and rose
nearly 50 per cent in the last five years alone. The New Zealand experience is of particular interest since compulsory health insurance has
been in effect there for 10 years; and it might thus be expected that
the cost of the medical and health care benefits would have become
stabilized after the first few years. Instead, the costs climbed.
"Thus all the evidence indicates that the financial burden of a
compulsory health insurance system would be very great on the American
people and on the economy. Can the nation afford any new burden
of such dimensions, and such potentially far-reaching consequences, when
the over-all cost of Government in the nation is already so high-well
over 25 cents of every dollar of national income, according to the latest
figures? When the Federal Government itself is again running a deficit
in its budget? When the public debt stands at $252 billions, equivalent
to $1,700 for every man, woman and child in the country? And when
the nation is committed to such future obligations as the Old Age and
Survivors' Insurance program which, on the liberalized basis now being
considered by Congress, will alone cost anywhere from $13 to $20 billions
a year, according to official estimates, in the lifetime of the majority of
today's children?"
There are elements of costs to be considered other than the money required to pay for the benefits and to maintain the host of additional government employees needed in the administration of the plan. For example, will
the cost of financing the system be done at the expense of other factors that
contribute to good health, such as good housing, wholesome food, recreation
and travel? Most important of all, however, what will the cost be in terms of
the quality of our medical care?
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One certain effect of compulsory health schemes is that the quantity of
medical care will be increased. This very quantitative increase, the overutilization inherent in the plan, will inevitably lower the quality of medical
care because the time and energy of those rendering the care can go only so
far. The deterioration of medical care is definitely one of the costs that must
be counted in an appraisal of the merits of the bill. Apropos of this point,
some additional provisions of the bill cannot be dismissed from consideration.
The Government Medicine Man
The proponents of compulsory health insurance self-righteously disclaim advocacy of socialized medicine, with its evil connotations. They say
their proposed system does not contemplate that the government will own
or operate hospitals or that doctors will be converted into government employees, and that the plan will not substantially change the status of those
rendering hospital and medical care. Whether these assertions, if factual,
would sustain the disclaimer of socialization of medicine depends upon how
the term is defined. But is the disclaimer based on facts; and if so, shall
we be so naive as to believe that the Administration's present proposal is the
ultimate, rather than merely the initial stage of a nationalization program
which, like any malignant condition, if once started will uncontrollably grow.
One cannot impartially review the comprehensive scope of the administrative power delegated by S. 1679, however, and escape the conviction
that this proposal takes a long step towards the socialization of medicine.
The National Health Insurance Board which the bill establishes shall
perform "such functions as it finds necessary to carry out the provisions of
this title, and shall make all regulations and standards specifically authorized
to be made in this title", and such other regulations not inconsistent with the
title as may be necessary. With these regulations the doctor must comply
if he enters into an agreement for the furnishing of services. To the lawyer,
familiar as he is with existing administrative regulations touching much
simpler matters, I am sure it will seem a plausible forecast that such regulations will assume prodigious bulk and complexity. The bill goes further,
however, and provides that all functions of the board shall be administered
"under the direction and supervision of the Federal Security Administrator,"
thus vesting in one man immeasurable power. Among the functions of the
national board is that of establishing "standards as to the special skills and
experience required to qualify an individual to render each such class of
specialist services as benefits under this title" and prescribing, by regulation,
maximum rates for hospitalization furnished as benefits. The Federal Security
Administrator, through such units of the Federal Security Agency as he
may determine, shall upon his own initiative or upon application of any individual make determination as to the eligibility of individuals for benefits.
Agreements are to be made with doctors and dentists for the furnishing
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of medical and dental services (other than specialist services) and these
agreements shall provide "for payment (1) on the basis of fees for services
rendered as benefits according to a fee schedule; (2) on a per capita basis,
the amount being according to the number of individuals eligible for benefits
who are on the practitioner's list; (3) on a salary basis, whole time or part
time; or (4) on such combinations or modifications of these bases including
separate provisions for travel and related expenses, as may be approved by
the State Agency". The method of compensation is to be determined for a
health service area by the majority of practitioners under agreement to
furnish services in that area. In arriving at the amount of fees the practitioner
is to receive, the bill provides that regard must be had for the annual income
which the payment will provide, to the degree of specialization, and to the
skill, experience and responsibility involved in rendering the services; but
these fees, the bill says, must be adequate to provide professional and financial
incentives to practitioners to advance and to practice where needed and to
encourage high standards in quality of services. This provision for adequacy
of fees, not found in predecessor bills, apparently assumes that the science
of medicine may be advanced, and the high standard in quality of medical
service may be maintained, merely by waving the magic wand of money.
In concluding the discussion of this point, the following quotation from
a recent address of Dr. A. Lawrence Abel of London is enlightening: "First
of all, about the effect on the public, there is no doubt that there is a certain
portion of the public which favors socialized medicine with the thoughtlessness and greed which characterizes the man or woman not astute enough to
realize that because they are paying nothing at the time, they are actually
not getting anything free. There are certain people who delight in thinking
they are getting something for nothing, especially if it comes out of the
government. This situation has to be seen to be believed The most serious
aspect, I believe, sir, from the public's angle, is that the material benefits
which they get at exorbitant cost cloak the real loss of true medicine."
One of my prefatory remarks was to the effect that lawyers had a concern in this legislation because of its probable impact upon them as members
of a profession. In that vein, I conclude with the thought which is sufficiently
expressed in the following quotation from the 1949 Report of the Standing
Committee on Legal Aid Work of the American Bar Association:
"During the coming summer, it is expected that the British Parliament will enact legal aid legislation providing government funds to
cover legal assistance for indigent persons and also for a large segment
of the population in the lower income brackets. Although it is argued
that since the handling of the funds will be under the direction of The
Law Society, the bar remains independent, the scheme can conceivably
- be a long step toward socialization of the legal profession. Its operation in
this country would have consequences most lawyers would not like to
envisage."
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Providing Adequate Medical Care
-A Response to the AMA
By

WILLIAM

F.

REYNARD AND CARLE WHITEHEAD

of the Denver Bar

Accompanying a recent bar association publication, the members of the
bar received propaganda material issued in the name of the American Medical
Association, including a booklet entitled "Compulsory Health Insurance versus
Health-the American Way. ' Assurance was given that the "other side"
would be presented in DICTA at a later date. A full presentation of the
"other side" would fill several DICTAS. There is here presented as much of the
"other side" as reasonable space limits permit.
The AMA material referred to was prepared by Whitaker & Baxter,
San Francisco publicity agents, as a part of their work for what is said to be
the largest "public relations" fee on record-paid from the $3,500,000 fund
raised by a $25-per-member assessment for fighting proposed compulsory
health insurance.
On February 11, 1949, Dr. Edwards A. Park and 167 other distinguished
physicians issued a statement roundly scoring AMA leadership for failing
to "come forward with a comprehensive, constructive plan to extend and improve medical care" and refusing to pay the assessment if it were to be used
for "propoganda and lobbying". Two days later the AMA published a 12point program "for the advancement of medicine and public health". Exam,
ination of the 12 points makes obvious its hasty preparation in an effort to
meet the telling criticism of Dr. Park and associates. Although hastily prepared, incomplete and ill-considered, it remains the only alternative to compulsory health insurance proposed by the AMA to meet the nation-wide need
for more and better health education and medical and hospital care. That
need is a matter of common knowledge and is impliedly admitted by the
AMA itself in its proposal of a program allegedly designed to meet that need.
Let us, therefore, briefly consider the AMA 12-point program, the legislation pending in Congress and the British "National Health Service" program (still in its early trial stage).
A sketch of AMA's past attitude toward plans to meet the nation's need
for better health and medical service will help in understanding and evaluating the 12-point program and in arriving at some conclusion regarding its real
objectives and its results, if put into practice.
In 1932 the AMA Journal blasted voluntary health plans as "socialism,
communism-inciting to revolution" and rejected the majority report of the
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (headed by Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur,
former AMA president and Secretary of Interior under President Hoover)
recommending prepaid insurance and group practice.
When Blue Cross began in 1933, the Journal branded it as a "half-baked
scheme" and sniped at the American College of Surgeons, who approved the
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Blue Cross plan in 1934. Even as late as 1940 the Wisconsin State Medical
Society forbade local units cooperating with Blue Cross.
AMA's Record vs. Voluntary Health Groups
The AMA's opposition to group health insurance followed "the American Way" to such a point that in 1938 the Department of Justice brought
a criminal suit under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against AMA and the
District of Columbia Medical Society. Evidence revealed that employees of
Home Owners Loan Corporation had organized a comprehensive cooperative
health program called Group Health Association; that the District Society
after having failed in a court attack on the Group, had tried to destroy the
plan by refusing admission of Group doctors to practice and barring Group
patients from Washington hospitals. The District Court convicted and fined
the Society and the Association, U. S. v. American Medical Association et al.,
130 F. 2d 233. Upon appeal the District Court was affirmed in the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the District and the Supreme Court refused certiorari.
The Circuit Court of Appeals commented:
. .. Profound changes in social and economic conditions have
forced members of all professional groups to make readjustments. The
fact that these changes may result even in depriving professional people
of opportunities formerly open to them does not justify or excuse their
use of criminal methods to prevent changes or to destroy new institu,
tions. Lawyers, too, have seen during recent decades, large scale changes
in their professional work....
"Professions exist because the people believe they will be better
served by licensing especially prepared experts to minister to their needs.
The licensed monopolies which professions enjoy, constitute in themselves
severe restraints upon competition. But they are restraints which depend
upon capacity and training, not special privilege. Neither do they justify
concerted criminal action, to prevent the people from developing new
methods of serving their needs. There is sufficient historical evidence of
professional inadequacy to justify occasional popular protests. . . . The
people give the privilege of professional monopoly and the people may
take it away."
Finding direct opposition to insurance schemes untenable, AMA and
professional medical societies in the various states belatedly organized insurance plans completely under their own control. They entered the political
field and lobbied for laws restricting to the medical profession alone the right
to organize and administer insurance plans. The success of their efforts is
indicated by the fact that today 22 states have laws granting virtual monopolies
to state medical organizations in the field of health insurance. Such laws add
irony to Whitaker & Baxter's cliche-ridden pamphlets bearing the slogan
"Keep politics out of medicine". They carefully omitted the warning "Keep
medicine out of politics".
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The AMA 12-Point Program
With this background in mind, let us consider the first allegedly constructive proposal that has eminated from the AMA-namely the "12-point
program", which is, in substance, as follows:
1. Creation of a federal department of health of cabinet status, headed
by a doctor of medicine.
2. Promotion of medical research through a national science foundation.
Aid through the states to the indigent and medically indigent by
utilizing and expanding voluntary hospital and medical care plans.
4. Establishment in each state of a medical care authority to handle
funds.
5. Development of diagnostic facilities, health center and hospital
services.

6.
7.
S.
9.
10.

Establishment of local public health units.
Aid to mental hygiene clinics.
Health education programs administered through state agencies.
Provisions of facilities for care of the aged and chronically diseased.
Integration of veterans' medical care with other medical care programs.
11. Greater emphasis on programs of industrial medicine.
12. Adequate support with funds for medical, dental and nursing schools.
All of these proposals involve Federal financial aid.
One of the most telling appraisals of the AMA program comes from
a member of the profession, Dr. Channing Frothingham of Boston, twice
president of the Massachusetts Medical Society:
"AMA's first proposal-for creation of a federal Department of
Health with cabinet status-was rejected by the 80th Congress and was
more recently turned down by the Hoover Commission and the House
Expenditures Committee. .

.

. The proposal for putting a doctor in the

cabinet is as out of step with American tradition as for the Army to
demand a general in the cabinet. ...
"Some of AMA's 12 points are mere pious platitudes calling for
expansion of present government activities such as health education and
industrial medicine (Nos. 8 and 11). Some already are incorporated in
law-such as government aid for construction of hospitals (No. 5) and
a program for mental hygiene (No. 7). Others are included in legislation
now pending before Congress-such as creation of a national science
foundation (No. 2); state medical care authorities (No. 4); aid for local
public health services (No. 6); and expansion of medical, dental and
nursing education (No. 12). The AMA has initiated none of these
advances. The AMA is merely accepting the inevitable and belatedly
jumping onto the band -wagon as it has in the case of most social advances in the past.
"The AMA's only proposal for meeting the national problem is
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the same as before-voluntary health insurance. It has not moved an
inch on this basic issue, despite all the window dressing.
"Voluntary health insurance has proved it cannot meet the nation's
needs. Despite the AMA's frantic effort to promote such programs in
order to head off compulsory insurance, the voluntary medical insurance
plans favored by the AMA cover less than a sixth of the population and
offer only limited protection. They are either wholly controlled by the
AMA's state and local medical societies or are merely cash benefits paying a fraction of medical costs through insurance companies....
"The AMA proposes that government funds, provided by the taxpayers, be used to aid these private programs so that they can take in the
'indigent and medically indigent' persons. The AMA's own statistics
show that 80 percent of the population-all of those with incomes under
$5,000 a year, are not able to meet the expenses of serious illness out of
their own resources. The AMA's so-called program means that millions
of self-respecting American families would have to be labelled as 'medically indigent', after an investigation of their personal finances, before
they could get the government aid the AMA proposes.
"The AMA has fought national health insurance, the cost of which
would be borne by the beneficiaries and their employers, as too expensive.
It has made no estimate of the cost of its own point nine, or its proposal
to subsidize AMA-controlled voluntary insurance plans. We challenge
the American Medical Association to make such estimates. They might
disclose that organized medicine is more concerned over who controls the
finances of medical care than how much it costs the people."
The Truman Health Plan in Contrast
Disapproval of the AMA's aggregation of generalities called a "program"
does not mean that we should adopt the so-called Truman Health Plan, as
incorporated in proposed and pending legislation, in its present form.
Three bills are pending in the Senate, all introduced in the first session
of the 81st Congress. Seven were introduced and are pending in the House
(HR 4918-4924 inclusive). Any detailed discussion of even one of these
bills is precluded by space limitations. The titles of the three Senate bills indicate the objects (quite similar to the avowed objectives of the AMA
"program" but without the "doctor control" features). These are S.5 "A
Bill to provide a national health insurance and public health program";
S.1970 "A Bill to facilitate the broader distribution of health services, to
increase the quantity and improve the quality of health services and facilities,
and for other purposes"; and S. 1679, "A Bill to provide a program of national
health insurance and public health and to assist in increasing the number of
adequately trained professional and health personnel, and for other purposes".
The plan proposed in these bills is, substantially, a government operated
form of group insurance, providing medical, surgical, dental and hospital
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services to those who pay premiums, and their dependents, wage-earners being
required to pay the premiums in the form of a withholding tax. However, if
the insured shall not have earned certain minimums for specified periods he
is not eligible for the benefits. Some provision is made for the destitute in
form of charity. The plan amounts to a combination of ordinary (but government-operated) group health and medical insurance for some, and "alms
giving" of such services to others but, altogether, providing for not more than
60% of the population, according to the estimates of its advocates, which
figure it is hoped could be increased to 90%.
Objection is made to such a plan because of its enormous cost. This
is not a valid objection for several reasons. First, its aggregate cost would
probably be no more (very likely less) than the aggregate now paid
directly, or through private insurance, for all health services. Most of such
direct and insurance expenses would be eliminate by the proposed plan.
There should be added to those expenses which would be eliminated by the
new plan, the wages now lost, or unemployment compensation paid, on account of absences from work resulting from diseases preventable by the more
comprehensive health services which could be rendered under the proposed
plan. The expenses would be changed in form or transferred but not necessarily increased.
The establishment of a public school system was opposed because of its
expense and, especially, it was said to be unjust to tax childless people for the
education of the children of others. Such objections would now be laughed
at because we have learned that an educated community is worth all it costs
and that the resulting benefits, even to the childless, greatly outweigh the
burden of their school tax. If this be true of schools and an educated community, how much more will it be true of adequate health service resulting
in a healthy community. The good health of all individuals in the~community is of immediate and even greater concern to all the community than is the
education of all individuals.
Second, we appropriate billions annually for army, navy and air force.
General Eisenhower recently stated, in Denver, that these are "sterile" organizations, doing nothing productive or constructive and are maintained
simply to protect what we have. If we freely spend billions for protection,
we should not hesitate to spend billions to make our country more worth
protecting.
Out of the present Federal tax dollar more than seventy-five cents goes
for wars past, present and future and only six cents for welfare work. A
substantial change in these proportions could well be made.
The objection to the plan on the ground of expense seems unjustified.
The Objection on The Grounds of "Bureaucracy"
The plan is objected to because it would create another large and powerful administrative agency subject to all the criticisms aimed at bureaucracy
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generally. This objection is invalid in part and valid in part. The plan would
eliminate much duplication by coordinating and consolidating into one comprehensive organization a number of government agencies now working in
the fields of public health and public welfare, separately and without any
correlation. To this extent, at least, the objection is invalid. The principal
validity of the objection lies in the fact that the plan is incomplete and not
all-inclusive. Only defined groups or classes are subject to the withholding
tax. Only certain defined groups or classes are entitled to the services. Only
those individuals within the classes or groups whose wages for defined periods
meet certain minimum requirements, are eligible for benefits. There is distinction between the insured and the destitute. Each of these limitations necessitates what may inelegantly be called "bureaucrats" to investigate and pass
upon eligibility. This branch of the work would involve more red tape
(forms to be filled out, filed, etc.), more controversy and probably result in
more dissatisfaction and expense than any other branch of the agency in
charge of the administration of the plan. This could all be eliminated by
making the plan all-inclusive-free health service to all who need it, as we
furnish free education to all without regard to wages earned, taxes paid or
taxes withheld. The raising of social and political morale by elimination of
the red tape and the most objectionable part of the "bureaucracy", plus the
resulting facilitation of administration of the plan and a higher standard of
national health would, of themselves, fully justify the added expense of the
all-inclusive free health services. The money saving of administration expense
would be a further and most substantial compensation. This phase of the subject will be again referred to in discussion of the British plan to which attention
is now directed.
Britain has had nearly 40 years of experience with a limited health insurance plan similar in many respects to the President's proposal for the
United States. It was inaugurated in 1911 and was limited to those in the
wage bracket under $1680 per year (a total of about 22 million). The funds
were inadequate and fees to participating physicians hardly more than nominal. These facts caused the plan to be stigmatized as "charity" (with all its
objectionable connotations) and caused the physicians to neglect patients under
the plan and give their better services to the higher paying private patients.
The present predictions that service will be of poor quality under the present
British plan are falsely based upon experience under the 1911 law.
The New British Plan Superior
Because of this long and unsatisfactory experience with the limited and
restricted 1911" plan, the National Health Service Act (passed in 1946 and
put into operation July 5, 1948) expanded the coverage to the whole population and made all services free regardless of earnings. The removal of restrictions and limitations both on kinds of service and recipients, transferred a
large part of the administration expense, required by the old plan, to payment
for health services rendered.

256

DICTA

About one-sixth of the total expense of the new plan is provided by
withholdings from wages and the balance by general taxation, the same as
we provide funds for schools. Administration of funds is through local executive councils and hospital boards, thus insuring responsibility to local problems and local needs. Participating doctors are paid by a capitation fee for
each patient plus extra fees for special services rendered. Today 95 percent
of the population of Britain is served by the plan. Eighty-nine percent of
the doctors and 92 percent of the dentists have now joined the national health
service. The present plan has eliminated the expensive and bureaucratic procedure of dividing the population into "indigent and non-indigent groups",
and has concentrated the energies of its administrative machinery and medical
staff on the problem of providing the best possible medical care for all of the
people.
The British plan has been in operation less than 15 months-less than a
year when much of the opposition propaganda was published in this country.
A program furnishing full health service to the entire population of England,
Scotland and Wales (about 45,000,000 people) cannot be either approved or
condemned on the basis of results of one year of operation.
In place of careful analysis of the principles involved and a calm survey
of the net overall results, the critics pick out minor features for ridicule.
Much stress is laid by the opposition on the furnishing of free wigs to the
bald heads. The tremendous demand for eyeglasses is cited, but the critics
evade the shameful fact that, before the inauguration of the present plan,
thousands were struggling along without needed glasses or bought them at
Woolworth's, or inherited them from relatives. That such a condition is
being remedied is cause for rejoicing-not for condemnation of the remedy.
After a hurried trip to England, Dr. Fishbein (recently muzzled Editor
of the AMA Journal) pointed to the long lines of waiting patients, the overloading of physicians and the inadequate health facilities as results of the new
scheme. Obviously much of the apparent inadequacy of services is the leftover from decades of practice a la free enterprise. Dr. Fishbein's rather naive
conclusion, that a comprehensive scheme for spreading the costs of medical
care over the whole population inevitably results in inferior medical care, is
not borne out by available facts. Nor is the conclusion fair after so short a
period of operation. It will take years for the British to build adequate
facilities and to train the necessary staff.
Dr. Fishbein and his Tory counterparts charge that there is much
"'malingering" and "abuse of privilege". It would be strange if there were
not, but the charges are petty in view of the benefits which have been brought
to those unable to read for lack of proper glasses; to those living in the
miserable isolation of deafness because hearing aids were beyond their financial
reach; and to the vast majority of people in Britain who had gone without
proper dental treatment all of their adult lives. No reasonable man will
maintain that the system will be totally free from abuse. The significant fact
is that Britain is now more effectively meeting her medical needs. Of course
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some time will be required to meet the flood of pent-up demand, and time will
be required to weed out abuse and malingering, but unbiased reports do not
prove that such is on the increase, or that making health services available
to all of the people has measurably increased abuses over earlier years of
private or charity practice. Dr. Stanford Cade, noted British specialist who
recently addressed the American Cancer Society, when asked about the truth
of stories that British doctors were overloaded with malingerers, replied that
he had not seen anything of the kind, that when the average Britisher calls on
the doctor, he really needs one.
Two facts stand out in the British situation. An administrative enterprise of such gigantic proportions went into operation without breakdown
or major difficulty and success has been such that the Tories find it politically
expedient to promise expansion of benefits under the plan. Space limitation
precludes discussion of many features of the British plan which will require
change in the light of fuller experience, but these two facts are strong, if not
conclusive, evidence that the universal "free" health service principle is
basically sound.
The provision of adequate medical services to all of the people according
to need will have to be realized sooner or later as a matter of national necessity in the United States. The AMA twelve points, as shown by the foregoing discussion, would lead only from confusion to futility. The plan proposed by the President is a halting step in the right direction, but, as we have
pointed out, it would be administratively awkward and would fall far short
of the goal. Why not plan boldly and adequately now?
Dier Memorial Services
As chairman of the Fellowship Committee of the Denver Bar Association,
Floyd W. Walpole paid tribute to the memory of the late John Q. Dier at
memorial services held at Crown Hill Mausoleum on September 11. Mr.
Dier, for many years a distinguished railroad attorney and member of the
Denver and Colorado bar associations, retired from practice in 1946. He
died at Languna Beach, Calif. on August 16, 1949.
Open Competitive Exam for Denver Postmaster
President Stanley H. Johnson of the Denver Bar Association has received
a letter from the U. S. Civil Service Commission requesting that publicity
be given the fact that an open competitive examination is being held for the
Denver postmaster position.
The closing date for this unassembled examination is October 11, 1949.
The Denver postmastership pays $9850 per year, and a similar position at
Durango, for which an examination is also being held, pays $4750. The
necessary forms and information- as to qualifications required may be obtained
at the post office.
Word has been received of the recent death of Loring W. Jordan of
Grand Junction.
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Should We Have a Constitutional Convention
In Colorado?
By HUBERT D. HENRY
of the Denver Bar

A review of the journals of the general assembly during the past few
years, some of the writing of students of government, and some of the discussions of organizations interested in government lead to the inevitable conclusion that there is great interest in Colorado in revising the state constitution. It does not seem plausible that so much activity would be in evidence
if there were not some need.
The 1949 General Assembly has placed upon the ballot for a vote in
1950 two very important and fundamental amendments. One gives the
council of a home rule city the power to submit amendments to the charter,
and removes the requirement that Denver must fix salaries of charter officers
in its charter. The other amendment provides for annual sessions of the general assembly, removes much of the hampering red tape surrounding the legislative body and generally improves legislative procedure.
In 1947 the general assembly submitted, and the voters adopted in 1948,
a constitutional amendment providing for an elective 5 member board of
education in lieu of the elective office of superintendent of public instruction.
In 1946 the voters approved an amendment submitted by the 1945 General
Assembly providing for the present secret unnumbered ballot.
In addition to these fine proposals, many other constitutional amendments
have been suggested. They include:
1. A 4-year term of office for state officers to be elected in non-presidential election years.
2. Elimination of the elective offices of secretary of state, state treasurer
and attorney general. The state auditor would be elected by the people or
by the general assembly and would be able to succeed himself in office.
3. Elimination of justices of the peace and other improvements in the
judiciary in accordance with the studies made by the Colorado Bar Association.
4. The Missouri plan for selecting judges.
5. A 4-year term of office for county officers to be elected in non-presidential election years.
6. Giving a county the right to frame and adopt a charter for its government.
7. A complete revision of civil service.
8. A revision of the old age pension amendment to permit more latitude
in the handling of state revenues.
9. Additional tax emption for veterans.
10. Legalizing gambling.
11. Reduction of the age of voters to 18 years.
12. Abolishing closed shop agreements.

DICTA

259

13. Some constitutional revision of the system of ear-marked funds,
either ear-marking only those funds where the income bears a direct relationship to the expenditure, or eliminating ear-marked funds completely.
Of course, some of these proposals do not justify serious consideration.
The majority of them do.
Piecemeal Amendment or Complete Overhzul?
Accepting the premise that some or all of these changes might be desirable, how should they be presented? Should they be presented as individual
amendments, or as a part of a completely new and rewritten constitution?
Should the writing of the amendments or the new constitution be done by the
general assembly, a constitutional convention, or a constitutional commission?
First, let us consider the question of a constitutional convention, and a
complete rewriting of our constitution.
The Colorado Constitution was written in 1876 during a period in history when the political thought supported a lengthy and detailed constitution
filled with safeguards. This political philosophy was very different from the
political philosophy of a century earlier when the U. S. Constitution was
written, which was that the constitution should be a basic framework of
government with a minimum of limits and restrictions. Colorado's Constitution is not unique, as all constitutions foliowed the political philosophy of
the era in which they were written.
Certainly a constitutional convention, if held in Colorado today, would
be urged not to write such a long document as the constitution now in existence. There are many provisions of this constitution which are unnecessary,
unduly lengthy, repetitious or obsolete. The amendments adopted over the
past 73 years have brought about certain inconsistencies of wording in the
constitution which makes it rather difficult to understand its exact meaning.
In view of all these facts, a new constitution would be highly desirable, and
I think that there are very few people who would disagree with this. The
question is: "What would be the cost in money and effort of obtaining a
new constitution and would having a new constitution justify this cost?"
The question of whether or not a constitutional convention should be
held has been three times submitted to the voters and three times rejected. It
can be safely said that the voters do not look with favor upon a constitutional
convention. We recently had the experience of a charter convention in Denver, which wrote and submitted to the people a good charter, a charter which,
although defective in some particulars, would be a great improvement over
our present charter. This new charter was rejected by the people.
The question of constitutional revision has been or is being considered
by other states, but constitutional conventions are not too popular. New"
Jersey has just adopted a new constitution written by a constitutional convention. Some years ago New Jersey established a constitutional commission,
which made many studies and drafted a constitution. This constitution
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was rejected, after which the holding of a convention was approved.
Although the new constitution does not follow the constitution prepared by
the commission and rejected by the voters in all respects, the studies made by
the commission were of inestimable importance in laying the groundwork for
the convention. There are constitutional commissions at work now in Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma, California, Kentucky, North Carolina, and South
Carolina. These commissions will report to their respective legislatures, and
the legislatures will undoubtedly place on the ballot many important proposals arising out of the recommendations of the commissions.
On the other hand, how have conventions fared? New Hampshire votes
every 7 years on whether or not a convention shall be called. A convention
was called, submitted six relatively unimportant amendments to the voters,
and adjourned. In Michigan the establishment of a constitutional commission
was proposed. Instead the legislature submitted to a vote of the people in
1948 the question of whether or not a constitutional convention should be
called. A majority of those voting on the question approved the convention,
but the question had to be approved by a majority of those voting at the
election, so Michigan has neither a commission or a convention. Kentucky
refused to approve the holding of a constitutional convention, and the governor subsequently appointed a constitutional commission.
Constitutional Commissions Popular and Necessary
It would thus seem that constitutional commissions are more popular than constitutional conventions, the only successful convention in the
very recent years having been held in New Jersey on the heels of a constitutional commission.
The importance of constitutional commissions is becoming more apparent,
just as legislative interim committees and councils are becoming much more popular. Commissions, consisting of small groups, well-staffed with research assistants, can gather much basic information needed in the revision of a constitution,
and without which a constitutional convention is not likely to succeed. Feeling that this research, and the results thereof are so much more important
than the actual writing of the constitutional amendments, the tendency is to
emphasize the commission and minimize the convention.
What are the reasons most often given for not having a constitutional
convention? I will list them as follows:
1. Hesitation of the voters to authorize a convention without knowing
in advance who will be in control. In other words, if we can elect our crowd
to the constitutional convention, we are for it, but if the other gang might get
in, we are against it, because we are afraid of what that gang will propose.
Therefore, not being absolutely sure that our crowd will control the convention, we vote against it.
2. Although the constitution is poorly written in some respects and
could be greatly improved by a complete rewriting, many of its defects are
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doing no harm, and the principal defects can be corrected by a few amendments.
3. Complete revolution is not the normal way of life. We tend to
follow the pattern of making a few changes at a time. We have had several
instances of attempted revisions of certain laws in this state in the past few
years. The code of civil procedure was completely rewritten. The new rules
of civil procedure are a tremendous improvement over the old code and yet
even now there is great feeling among some of the lawyers who practiced
long under the old code that a few simple changes should have been made,
and that a complete set of rules should not have been written at one time.
We tried to get a completely rewritten probate law, but met with such great
resistance that we had to abandon the idea and made only a few changes
which appeared to be necessary or desirable. Other suggestions for complete
recodification of laws have been made but have met with great resistance.
The people do not want a complete change. They will be much happier and
much more contented if simple amendments be made a few at a time.
4. Amendments will be easier to pass than a completely new constitution. Each amendment would be voted upon on the basis of its own merits,
and each amendment would receive only the opposition which would accrue
against that particular proposal. On the other hand, it is the history of constitutions and charters that those who oppose any one provision of the new
instrument will fight the entire thing. Were a new charter or new constitution to be submitted item by item, probably every item would pass by favorable vote, but with all of the opposition to each item combined against the
entire instrument, it is almost certain of failure, particularly if it makes many
changes.
5. The expense of a constitutional convention is not justified. The general assembly has authority to submit amendments to the constitution. The
general assembly could also create a constitutional commission to study
amendments to the constitution, presenting these amendments to the general
assembly for submission to the voters. This would be much less expensive
than a constitutional convention. In fact, as above stated, the establishment
of a constitutional commission would be necessary anyway to make the preliminary studies. If Amendment No. 2 submitted to the voters in 1950 is
passed, the general assembly will meet annually, and although the sessions
in even numbered years will be generally limited to budgetary and special
matters, yet they will be able to propose amendments to the constitution.
By making it easier for the general assembly to submit amendments to the
constitution, particularly in even numbered years, in limited sessions where
the legislators will not have their time greatly consumed by other matters,
there is no reason why the general assembly cannot propose all of the necessary amendments.
6. The present provisions for holding a constitutional convention are
very bad. Suppose a call for constitutional convention were to be placed
upon the ballot in 1950 by a special session of the present general assembly and
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of 1952, the delegates to the constitutional convention would be elected upon
party tickets. These delegates would then meet within 90 days in a constitutional convention. Ninety days after the early part of November 1952 would
be the early part of February 1953, at which time a legislative session would
be in full operation. We would, therefore, have a legislative session and a
constitutional convention going at the same time. Also, the delegates would
be elected in a general election, and undoubtedly many of the voters would
cast their votes for convention delegates on the basis of their choice for president and not on the basis of their ability to write a constitution, and would
add further to the confusion now existing in general elections where the
voters of Denver generally vote upon approximately 40 officers.
A Suggested Course of Action
Here are my suggestions for revising the constitution:
1. The general assembly should establish a constitutional commission.
It should give this commission authority to hire help, study the constitution,
consult with citizens and groups of citizens and propose to the general assembly amendments to the constitution, which amendments then should be
submitted to the voters by the general assembly. If, after establishment of
such a constitutional commission, it should appear desirable to submit to the
voters the question of calling a constitutional convention, the commission
would be of great help in submitting to the convention the results of any
studies made by it, thus considerably reducing the time necessary to be spent
by the convention.
2. In preparation for some eventual constitutional convention, the general assembly should submit to a vote a constitutional amendment which would
(a) eliminate the restriction against the general assembly's submitting amendments to more than six articles at one election, and (b) revise the procedure
for calling a convention so that, upon approval of a convention by the people,
the convention delegates would be elected at a special election in approximately May following. Then the convention would meet in approximately
September following, and the vote on the new constitution would be held at
a special election in approximately the following March. The convention
should be authorized to submit either amendments or an entire constitution.
It seems to me the proper thing to do is to see to it that the two amendments placed on the ballot in 1950, particularly Amendment No. 2, providing
for annual sessions of the general assembly and for other legislative improvements, are adopted by the voters. Then, we should follow the procedure
above suggested for presenting to the voters from time to time a number of
amendments to the constitution, rather than spend too much time working
for a constitutional convention.
Clifford W. Mills, successor to Gabriel, Mills and Mills, and dean of
the Westminster Law School, has moved his law office from the C. A. Johnson
Bldg. to 1854 California St., Denver.
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Property Rights Emancipated: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases
By WILSON P. WALCHER of the Denver Bar
(Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law)

Roscoe Pound once wrote that often "courts .. .take the rules
as a general guide, determine what the equities of the cause demand, and
contrive to ...render a judgment accordingly, wrenching the law no more
than is necessary."' The process was well illustrated in the Restrictive Covenant cases which were considered by the Supreme Court in May, 1948.2
The problem, which has been before the state and federal courts for more than
fifty years, is whether the courts should enforce real estate agreements that
bar a fellow citizen from occupying or owning this house or that because of
the color of his skin, the nature of his religious beliefs, or the character of his
national origin.
Whether wisely or not the court answered the problem by holding that
judicial enforcement by state courts of covenants restricting the use or occupancy of real property to persons of the Caucasian race, to violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court said, ". . . Conceding that the Amendment is directed against state action only and does not
reach private conduct, however discriminatory, the judicial action, even
though for the enforcement of private agreements, is state action, and so
within the Fourteenth Amendment; and that the enforcement of restrictive
covenants against certain races is none the less discriminatory because courts
any race against whom they are directed, includwill enforce them against
3
ing the white race."1
Widespread Interest in Cases
be appreciated that the time was ripe for the deit
must
At the outset
cision in the Restrictive Covenant cases. In October 1947 the Report of the
President's Committee on Civil Rights had roundlyr denounced judicial enforcement of these agreements. The committee recommended the enactment
by the states of laws outlawing restrictive covenants, and there was renewed
court attack, with intervention by the Department of Justice, upon restrictive
covenants. The committee pointed out that the effectiveness of restrictive
covenants depends in the last analysis on court orders enforcing the private
'Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922), as noted in 61
Harv. L. Rev. 927 (1948).
'Shelley v. Kraemer and McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge and
Uricola v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) arising in Missouri, Michigan, and the District
of Columbia, respectively. Hereafter, these cases will be referred to as the Restrictive
Covenant cases.

'Ibid., Shelley v. Kraemer, p. 10.
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agreements.
The power of the state is thus utilized to bolster discriminatory
4
practices.
While no accurate data is available, there were a substantial number of
these cases pending throughout the country. The California Supreme Court
had thirty such cases, and the state of Illinois had almost as many involving
property in Chicago. 5 When the U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
two state and two District of Columbia cases, the litigation before the court
became the focal point of nation-wide interest. Twenty-three briefs on behalf
of amici curiae were filed with the court,6 one of them by the Attorney General of. the United States, urging that judicial enforcement of these restrictions violated the constitutional limitations on the power of the several states
and the federal government.
There was a large attendance, and the proceedings of the trial were
given wide publicity, and when the decisions were announced four months
later they were generally hailed as a victory for equal rights of racial minorities and were regarded as likely to be far-reaching in their effects and "to
7
serve to extend social and economic justice."
The court apparently seems determined to make sure that the great generalities of the Constitution, and especially those of the Fourteenth Amendment, have realistic meaning and assure everyone, regardless of race, creed,
color, or ethnic origin, the broad protections of the basic charter of our democratic republic. The scope of this paper will include an examination of the
novel extension of the Fourteenth Amendment established by these decisions.
This examination will embrace both the legality or illegality and the practicability or impracticability of certain schemes suggested to circumvent the
ruling handed down by the Supreme Court. It must be remembered throughout this discussion that the crux of the decision rests upon state action in enforcing restrictive devices, rather than upon the use of such devices when
not entailing the use of state judicial machinery.
Previous Cases in the Federal Courts
Popular use of restrictive agreements began in 1917, when the United
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional 8 a city ordinance forbidding any
' Reported appellate decisions show that at least sixteen states and the District of
Columbia provided judicial enforcement for restrictions on occupancy by particular racial,
religious, and national groups, and ten of these jurisdictions also enforced restrictions on
ownership. Colorado, under the decisions in Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 P.
822 (1930), approved in Howard v. Cronan et al., 105 Colo. 393, 98 P. 2d 999 (1939),
apparently had enforced both restrictions.
' William J. Mind, Jr., Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
Univ. of Chicago L. R. 204.
'Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at p. 3.
New York Herald-Tribune, p. 22, col. 1 (May 4, 1948) and others.
'Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
668 (1927), reaffirming Buchanan v. Warley.

See also Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S.
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white person or any Negro to move into and occupy any house in a city block
where a majority of the houses were already occupied by persons other than
their own race as a deprivation by the state of the property owner's right to
dispose of the property to whomsoever he wishes. Such legislative action is
forbidden by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the decision in this case led to the popular use by white landowners of agreements, conditions, and covenants in deeds to exclude nonCaucasians from purchasing or occupying residential property, at least one
reported case had even earlier considered constitutional problems in connection with the enforcement of restrictions on the sale or occupancy of land by
members of a particular racial group. 9 In that case the deed under which
plaintiff took title to the land involved in the litigation contained an agreement
that the premises were never to be rented to a "Chinaman". The plaintiff having conveyed a part of the property to the defendant, suit was brought by the
former to enjoin the latter from renting to "Chinamen", who were also made

parties defendant.
In refusing relief, the court referred to the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and stated: "It would be a very narrow construction of the Constitutional Amendment in question, and of the decisions
based on it, and a very restricted application of the broad principles upon
which both the Amendment and decisions proceed, to hold that while state
and municipal legislatures are forbidden to discriminate against the Chinese
in their legislation, a citizen of the state may lawfully do so by contract, which
the courts may enforce. Such a view is, I think entirely inadmissable. Any
result inhibited by the Constitution can no. more be accomplished by contract
of individuals (citizens) than by legislation, and the courts should no more
enforce the one than the other. 10 Prior to the Restrictive Covenant cases,
Judge Ross's precedent 11 had been largely ignored, but sixty years later it
has become the cornerstone of what may perhaps be one of the leading cases
of our time. It is also significant to note that the court in this case relied upon
the provision of a treaty with China to justify the decision. This was partly
12
the basis for the decision in the Hurd case, which will be discussed later.
Thirty years elapsed before the question of constitutionality of a restrictive agreement against a particular race arose after Gandolfo v. Hartman,
49 Fed. 181 (1892).

This was the case of Corrigan v. Buckley, 13 which arose

in the District of Columbia. This action was a suit to enjoin the defendant
from selling a lot to a would-be colored purchaser, in violation of a restrictive
covenant. The colored defendant took the position that the covenant was void
in that it deprived him of due process of law. Following the state cases, the
:Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892).
Iolbid., p. 182.
"Gandolfo v. Hartman, ibid.
"Hurd v. Hodge, supra, note 2. While the court did not specifically mention the
United Nations Charter, it is generally believed that it was intended when the court
spoke of the national public policy.
"Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
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court rejected his argument on the ground that the civil rights clauses of the
14
Constitution do not apply to private arrangements among individual citizens.
On appeal, the Supreme Court said it did not raise a constitutional question
sufficiently substantial even to support jurisdiction on appeal.' 5
Defenders of restrictive covenants, and the state and federal courts in
enforcing them, had customarily relied on Corrigan v. Buckley, but in the
Shelley case, the court held that it was not in point because the case being
in the District of Columbia originated in the Federal court, and the Fourteenth
Amendment applied only to state action. The court also distinguished it on
the grounds that the only constitutionai issue appellants had raised in the
lower courts, and hence the only constitutional issue before the court, was
the validity of the covenant agreement as such.' 6
Types of Restrictive Covenants
Most racial covenants include all non-Caucasians. Some specify Negroes,
Mexicans, Spanish Americans and Orientals, and some include Jews. A few
include Armenians, Hindus, Syrians, or former residents of the Turkish Empire. There is, obviously, no limit to their inclusiveness, save that of the current state of community prejudice. Recently international relations have influenced the application of these compacts in certain sections of the nation.
In California, for example, the lower courts have refused to enforce racial
covenants against Mexicans because such action is contrary to the "Good
Neighbor Policy" at the same time that covenants specifying persons whose
blood is not entirely of the white race have been interpreted to include American Indians. In the companion case to the cases under discussion, McGhee v.
Sipes, the excluded class also included Orientals. I7 However, it is clear that
restrictive agreements are directed primarily against Negroes, and it is noteworthy that the Restrictive Covenant cases all arose in transactions concerning
this minority.
The scope of the decision in the Restrictive Covenant cases is very broad
and was predicated upon almost ideal fact situations. Racial restrictive agreements were of three general types. One type restricted either sale, lease,
conveyance to, or ownership by, any member of an excluded group. The second type prohibited use or occupancy by any member of such group. The
third prohibited both ownership and occupancy.'1 Some of these agreements
were limited in duration while others were to be perpetual.
The racial restrictive agreements which were joined and brought before
the Supreme Court for decision illustrate all three of these general types of
" Ibid., p. 331.
5While Corrigan v. Buckley was not expressly overruled by the Restrictive Cove,

nant cases, it no longer represents the law except to the proposition that restrictive
agreements are not unconstitutional in themselves, but only when resort is had to state
courts to enforce them.
"8
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at p. 8.
" McGhee v. Sipes, supra, note 2.
" This is a type that has been used in Colorado. See cases cited at note 4, supra.
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discriminatory real estate devices. Shelley v. Kraemer, one of the state cases,
involved a restrictive covenant limiting use and occupancy to the "Caucasian
race" for fifty years. The condition ran with the land and was to be a condi,
tion precedent to the valid sale of the land. The owners of various parcels
of land subject to the terms of the restrictive covenant brought action against
a Negro purchaser (Shelley) who had bought without knowledge of the restriction. The owners asked for an injunction restraining Shelley from taking
possession and for judgment divesting Shelley of title and revesting it in the
immediate grantor or such person as the court might direct.' 9
Sipes v. McGhee contained a restriction limiting ownership to members
of the Caucasian race, which was to run forever. In this case the Michigan
Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision directing the Negro purchasers
and enjoining them from
to move from their property within ninety days
20
using or occupying the premises in the future.
The third type of restriction was illustrated in Hurd v. Hodge, a case
wherein appeal was made from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. Here the prohibition was extended to sale, in addition to occupancy, and was to run indefinitely. The Circuit Court had sustained a
judgment of the District Court declaring the sale to a Negro purchaser null
and void, enjoining Negro purchasers from leasing or conveying the properties, and directing them "to remove themselves and all of their personal
belongings. "21

The Decisions
In rendering the decision the court pointed out that racial and religious
restrictive covenants are directed not at the use made of the property; but
rather at the user of the property, the prohibited racial group. Thus, it would
appear that the court felt that there is no justification for such restrictions
as there might be in the case of restrictions on the use of property for saloons,
restrictions may have a reasonable
slaughter houses, and factories, which
22
relation to public health and safety.
Then setting up the underlying philosophy of this decision, the court
said, ".. . the historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became
a part of the Constitution indicates that the matter of primary concern was
the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political
rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on the
part of the states based on considerations of race and color; and the provisions
of the 23Amendment are to be construed with this fundamental purpose in
mind".
1 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, note 2.

Sipes et al.v. McGhee et ux., 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. 2d, p. 638, (1947).
SHurd v. Hodge, 162 F 2d 233 (D.C. App. 1947).
n For a very complete discussion of restrictive covenants see 24 Notre Dame Lawyer 2 (1949), p. 169 and 3 A.L.R. 2d 466.
" Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at p. 10.
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After laying the foundation for the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment as concerns state action, the court said, "These are not cases,
as has been suggested, in which the states have merely abstained from action,
leaving private individuals free to impose such discrimination as they see fit.
Rather, these are cases in which the states have made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the
grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which
petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors
are willing to sell. Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply because the
particular pattern of discrimination, which the state has enforced, was defined
initially by the terms of a private agreement. State action . . .refers to
exertion of state power in all forms. And when the effect of that action is
to deny rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
24
the obligation of this court to enforce the constitutional commands."1
Thus, in general terms and in a brief manner, but with unusual boldness,
the court did what it has never done before and held that the action of a state
court in construing a private contract, such as a restrictive covenant, was
state action, if its effect is to lend the coercive power of judicial enforcement
in a constitutionally prohibited manner. Restrictive agreements are not dead,
since the court made it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment touches only
state actions and does not provide a shield against "merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful"; but a contract or property right without the protection of court action is illusory.
The compelling force behind the Restrictive Covenant cases is clear, and
and it is also clear that the decisions open the way for attack on other inhibited civil rights. The doctrine that one of the civil rights intended to be
protected against state action is the right to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose
of property is very likely to be carried over into the segregation practices
25
of the various states.
Possibilities of Escape
Where the precise logical limitation on the broad sweep of this new
doctrine will be applied must remain, for awhile, uncertain. It is to be expected, however, that since the court declared the restrictive agreements valid
if resort to the court is not had to enforce them, devices will be developed to
escape the effect of this decision, and in the following pages are discussed a
few that have been or are being considered. In considering these devices two
considerations must be borne in mind. First, are they in all respects legal?
Second, are they practical from the aspects of financial considerations and
enjoyment of ownership of property?
4

Ibid.,

at p. 20.
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the application of the decision
in the Restrictive Covenant cases to other areas, and it is suggested here only to illustrate
how broad the decision is, and its possible future use. For an interesting article on the
application of this decision to segregation practices see 21 So. Calif. L. Rev. 16 (1949).
2
'
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The first possibility is the ordinary legal remedy of a damage suit against
a seller who has sold in violation of a restrictive covenant. It would appear
that a defense resting on the illegality of such covenants would be within the
scope of the Restrictive Covenant cases. It is interesting to note that there
was a two thousand dollar penalty for breach of the covenant in the Hurd
case, and the reason for that specific amount is that the identical amount was
used in the Corrigan case; and since it met with approval when the case was
before the court, attorneys in Washington, D. C. have been using it ever since.
The court in the instant cases disregarded the penalty provision entirely.
Very frequently these covenants do contain provisions for liquidated damages,
but it would appear that if state action were used to enforce such provision,
it would run afoul of the decision. Further, there is the very important
objection that an action for damages, liquidated or otherwise, would hardly
suffice since the real objective of a restrictive agreement would require equitable
relief in the form of an injunction. In addition there is the purely economic
consideration that if liquidated damages were too high they would act as too
great a deterrant to prospective purchasers, and finally, if they were high
enough to obtain effective compliance with the agreement, the damages might
be considered as a penalty. This26 is true in the case of liquidated damages or if
a deposit or bond were posted.
The deposit or bond has been suggested to guarantee compliance with
the agreement. As has been pointed out, however, it is subject to the same
infirmities as liquidated damages and an ordinary suit for damages. There is
another difficulty here also if one party sued to recover the deposit. The
adversary's defense would very likely put him within the scope of the
Restrictive Covenant cases doctrine. Of course, there might then be urged the
defense of pari-delicto, but this would not seem to be a very sound position
because according to the rule of the cases, it is the enforcement of the agreement, and not its making or voluntary compliance with the agreement that
is wrong. More important than the legal objections, however, is the fact
that many purchasers would not be willing or able to make such a deposit.
Thus, segregation under such a scheme would be possible only to the extent
that parties are willing to pay for it. And finally, even if such a scheme were
to be developed and deposits were posted in substantial amounts, some home
owners in the group might find it profitable, or desirable for other reasons
to sell their property to one of the restricted members.
Another idea which has been widely suggested is the insertion of a covenant giving the original subdivider of a real estate development power to
approve or disapprove of future purchasers and occupants. The utility of
this device is obviously confined to new areas. This scheme has the particular
disadvantage of not being attractive to buyers and in addition might run
into the problem of restraint on alienation. The use of this device assumes
that there is a wide market for selection of buyers, which is probably true at
"McCormick, Law of Damages, (1935), p. 599.
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the moment, but in times of economic distress the subdivider may be hard
pressed to sell his property.
The Club Plan
The "club" plan has also been suggested as a way out. Title to the
property is held by a club or association, and members are entitled to the right
to occupy and maintain a particular dwelling and exercise the incidents of
ownership. Here again, the lack of title in the purchaser or member of the
club makes it difficult to transfer or use the property as a security device.
There is another very important consideration, and that is that since the
equitable title is in the purchaser, he could bring an action to free his title
from inclusion in the group on the theory that the covenants violate the rule
of the Restrictive Covenant cases. Of course, if the club membership requirement did not mention color, creed, or ethnic origin, then it might be difficult
to prove that the rule applied. However, in view of the court's vigorous attitude towards this type of agreement, it is believed that the court would look
through the form of the agreement and determine what the actual practice was.
The formal corporation is subiect to the same criticism and weakness
of the "club" plan, in that title would have to be surrendered and the further
objection that ownership would be represented by shares or certificates, which,
if transferred by a holder would have to be transferred on the corporation
stock books.Y
The use of the fee simple determinable may perhaps furnish an out for
those who seek to escape the Restrictive Covenant cases. A conveyance
vesting a fee simple in the grantee, until a certain specified event happens,
at which time the fee automatically reverts to the grantor or his successors,
is a fee simple determinable. While this device has been most frequently
suggested as a means of by-passing the Restrictive Covenant cases, it suffers
from a fundamental infirmity. Attention has already been called to the
fact that the Supreme Court acutely distinguished in the Restrictive Covenant
cases between a restriction on a class of purchasers or occupants (user) as
opposed to one on the use of the property. Thus, if the one against whom
the fee simple determinable operates refuses to vacate the premises after the
sale to him which would be the event causing the determination of the fee,
a writ of entry or suit for ejectment would be necessary. Judicial enforcement would be public action and as such subject to the same difficulty of
violating the equal protection clause. Moreover, the sale price of property
subject to this type of forfeiture clause would have to be set quite low to
induce a future purchaser to buy under such onerous possibility of reverter
and loss of ownership.
12 Fletcher, Corporations, Sec. 5518 (1932). Colorado would probably permit
an option in favor of the corporation to purchase the outstanding shares, but if there
were several sellers, an excessive economic burden would be placed upon the corporation
to take up all these interests. It might also be argued that restrictions on transfer are
unreasonable and serve a purpose in violation of the public policy.
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The same objections with perhaps more force apply to a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent, for breach of which the grantor has a right
of entry, but ownership remains in the garantee until the grantor has exercised
the right of entry reserved to him for breach of the condition subsequent.
The "Square Captain" plan is a proposal calling for appointment of
"square captains" in the community each of whom would voluntarily be given
options on the property in his block or area. If a property owner wishes to
sell he would notify the captain giving him the name of the prospective
buyer, and if he is found to be undesirable, the captain exercises the option
and buys the house himself (in reality for another more desirable buyer).
One objection to such a scheme is that resources may not be available to take
up all the options, and further, if the property was sold in violation of the
option and the captain brought action to set aside the sale, a court of equity
might inquire into the purposes of the option, which would be fatal to his
cause of action.
The "High Occupancy Standard" plan provides that covenants be inserted to require high occupancy standards, such as those governing the
minimum cost of dwellings, the number of occupants per room, type of construction, etc. In the main such covenants are perfectly legal, and in fact,
socially desirable in preserving the stability, appearance, and beauty of residential living. The trouble with this device as a restrictive scheme is that
Negroes and other minority groups have college educations, economic capacity,
and willingness to comply with such agreements.
Conclusion
While the schemes suggested are not the only means of escape, they are
the most popular devices at the moment for attempting to avoid the decision in
the Restrictive Covenant cases. It is apparent that in the final analysis all
the schemes suggested may ultimately require state court action, and with the
exception of the fee simple determinable and condition subsequent, are
economically undesirable. It is generally thought that effective control of
segregation will continue to remain with realtors and those responsible for
financing homes. 28 In a rather bitter comment by Mr. Alfred Long Scanlon,
the situation in this regard is well summarized when he states "Realtor 'ethics',
discrimination in mortgage and construction financing, and high purchase
areas that any further
prices are already holding the color line so well in such
29
protection would be merely gilding the white lily."1
Along with the attitude of this professional group will be the public
'24

Notre Dame Lawyer 187 (1949).

Ibid., at p. 189. Mr. Scanlon also noted that the Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards provides that "(a) realtor should never be instru-

mental in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, members of any race, or nationality, or any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood." A member board which fails to en,
force this Code of Ethics may be expelled from the Association. There is no doubt that
in times of economic distress this code would be flagrantly violated.
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opinion and attitudes of a particular community. While this attitude can no
longer be manifested through court action, it will certainly be made clear by
strict adherence to voluntary schemes of restriction. Further, economic and
social equality has not been achieved to such a degree that there will be any
wholesale attempts by minority groups to shift their housing and cultural
identity, and social affinity will tend to concentrate them in areas of their own
choosing.
Whatever form the community feeling may take, it is clear that the
Restrictive Covenant cases have drastically changed the rights in property
which assume the form of restrictive covenants. While these valuable property
rights were not abolished, the moral recognition of them without resort to
courts to preserve them makes them almost valueless. Whether the court
wrenched the law more than was necessary, in setting up the Fourteenth
Amendment as a standard in testing the particular devices in litigation
and then deciding the case on their ideas of social desirability, may
well be argued; but the vital importance of the decision cannot be denied.
While the decision is slightly weakened by the fact that its legal basis is not
clear as to what degree of participation is necessary to constitute state action,
the decision is not only going to be a precedent in the field of restrictive
agreements, but it may well be the point of attack upon all segregation
practices now existing.8 0

Industrial Health Attorneys to Meet
The first Rocky Mountain Conference on Industrial Health, which will
be held in the Denver Chamber of Commerce Building October 31 to November 2, will have one session devoted to the legal problems of industrial health
for the benefit of attorneys.
The attorneys' session will be conducted on Monday afternoon, October
31 and will cover the following fields:
"Industrial Hygiene Codes and their Impact upon Manufacturing Operations"-MR. THEODORE C. WATERS.
"Legislation and Judicial Trends in Utah as they Affect Occupational Disease Compensation"-MR. LYNN S. RICHARDS.
"Compensation for Partial Disability in Silicosis"-MR. 0. A.
GLAESER.

"Compensation Law Trends in Colorado"-MR. S.

ARTHUR

HENRY AND MR. RICHARD M. DAVIS.

The conference, dedicated to the purpose of informing industry representatives of the need and scope of industrial health programs, is sponsored
by the Division of Industrial Medicine of the University of Colorado.
' Note that three Justices did not participate in this decision. It has been suggested that all three owned property upon which were restrictive covenants of the type
in litigation.
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Attorneys and the Community Chest
Attorneys have not only a responsibility to the community in which they
practice their profession, but also the obligation to assume their fair share
of responsibility for the profession as a whole.
You will soon be solicited by the Attorneys' Division, and your prompt
and generous response will be appreciated greatly by the volunteer solicitor
representing the profession.
Regardless of where you practice, support your Community Chest generously.

"PREDICTIONS OF THINGS TO COME"
The November and December issues of the new DICTA will contain a complete revision of the well-known and useful article by Percy
S. Morris of the Denver Bar entitled "Curative Statutes of Colorado
Respecting Titles to Real Estate." These statutes were first compiled
and explained by Mr. Morris in 1939, in the February and March
DICTA of that year. Now, with the many changes in law and the
large number of lawyers who have been called to the bar in the past
ten years, Mr. Morris has kindly yielded to our entreaties to revise
his popular and profitable opus.
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